The Silent Revolution in Methods of Advocacy in English Courts by Watson, Andrew
The Silent Revolution in Methods of Advocacy in English 
Courts
WATSON, Andrew <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9500-2249>
Available from Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive (SHURA) at:
http://shura.shu.ac.uk/14304/
This document is the author deposited version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher's version if you wish to cite from it.
Published version
WATSON, Andrew (2016). The Silent Revolution in Methods of Advocacy in English 
Courts. Journal on European History of Law, 7 (2). 
Repository use policy
Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the 
individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print 
one copy of any article(s) in SHURA to facilitate their private study or for non-
commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or 
use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain.
Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive
http://shura.shu.ac.uk
 1 
 
 The Silent Revolution in Methods of  Advocacy in 
English Courts. 
 
 
Abstract. 
 
George Keeton wrote, in 1943, about “a  silent revolution in methods of advocacy as 
practiced by the English Bar  over  the la st fifty years” 1. Changed standards of etiquette, 
professional rules and greater control exerted by judges over these years led to a vast increase in 
courtesy in interactions with judges and between counsel. The conduct of prosecutions had also 
improved. They were generally no longer carried out in a sneering hectoring manner with 
witnesses mercilessly browbeaten or bullied. Dramatic types of 19th Century advocacy , in which 
counsel was prepared to use mannerisms , tricks of speech and gestures to heighten the effects of 
their pleas to juries, was replaced by a conversational and matter of fact tone. The idea that to 
cross-examine meant to examine crossly had almost vanished. Appeals to juries were now to 
reason combined with a controlled, subtle and focused appeal to emotion. Jury trials in civil 
cases had continued to decline. Advocacy before judges was concerned with facts and the law, 
not oratorical flourishes. Fewer criminal trials before juries took place as the jurisdiction of the 
magistrates had widened further. The more restrained and conversational style of advocacy 
before criminal juries may have been to some extent influenced by that of the civil courts, where 
the leaders of the bar appeared more often and increasingly without juries. Two dominant 
members of the bar during the first half of the 20th Century were Patrick Hastings and Norman 
Birkett. Their styles, because of triumphs linked with them, were influential on those of other 
barristers. Hastings was a master of direct forcible speech without any embellishments or 
ornamentation and prized brevity. Unlike Hastings, Norman Birkett believed that the advocate 
ought to use the full range of English speech. Other factors lay behind the mainly conversational 
and matter of fact advocacy that had become established. These include a widely held suspicion 
of rhetoric and, very importantly, better informed and greater educated juries. Jurors were less 
                                                          
1
 G. W. Keaton, Harris’s Hints on Advoca cy, Stevens and Sons, 1943, page 10.  
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susceptible than their predecessors to theatrical gestures and melodrama, which had largely been 
replaced in literature and on the stage by introspection and realism, references to God and the 
Bible, elegant and flowery, but empty, speech and appeals to strong emotion and prejudice. In a 
more scientific age jurors expected more of an appeal to reason. The success of barristers such as 
Hardinge Giffard, John Holker, Charles Russell and Edward Clarke, during  the closing decades 
of the previous  century, may have been because they appreciated early on the changes that were 
occurring to juries. Attempting to catch the eye of the press to help create a reputation, useful to 
generate work, was an important factor behind the emotive, vividly worded and aggressive 
advocacy of the early Victorian period and afterwards. The  later decline of court reporting in the 
newspapers, removing much of the gallery from the stage, may well have contributed to the more 
subdued form of speech.  
 
 
The silent revolution. 
      
In 1943, during wartime Britain, G. W Keeton, then Professor of English Law and Dean of 
the Faculties of Laws in The University of London and at the University College, London, 
wrote about “a silent revolution in methods of advocacy as practised by the English Bar ” 2 
that had taken place over the previous 50 years. He observed that changed standards of 
professional etiquette and steadily greater dignity of the judiciary 3  had led to a vast increase 
                                                          
2
 G. W. Keeton, Harris’s Hints on Advocacy, Stevens and Sons, 1943, page 10. 
3
 Certainly by the latter part of the Nineteenth Century most judges exerted authority over advocates in court , 
something not all of them had been able to do sufficiently earlier. (See George King, Lawyers and Eloquence, 
In William Andrews ed, The Lawyer in History, Literature and Humour, William Andrews and Co, 1896, page 
264. ). Contributing to deference and courtesy shown to judges by barristers was greater respect for their 
intellectual and practical abilities as lawyers. Beginning in the 1860’s both Conservative Lord Chancellors 
(Cairns) and Liberals ( Hatherley and Selborne ) sought to professionalise the judiciary and to make merit the 
consideration for appointment to the bench. ( Robert Stevens, The English Judges, Hart Publishing, Oxford and 
New York, 2005, Chapter One ) The movement towards meritocracy was to some extent impeded by Lord 
Halsbury (Hardinge Giffard) in the seventeen years he was Lord Chancellor between 1885 and 1905. His 
appointments were much criticised on the grounds “he appointed to the High Court, and to a  lesser extent the 
county court,men of little or  no legal learning whose previous career in public life had been la rgely in the 
service of the Conservative Party or else were rela tions of his own  “.  ( R. F. V. Heuston, The Lives of the 
Lord Chancellors 1885-1940, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987, page 36. ) . From Lord Haldane’s 
Chancellorship (1912-15) legal and professional qualifications firmly became the criteria, though at first the 
change was not extended to the most senior appointments. However, a little later, Lord Sankey, Lord 
Chancellor from 1929 to 1935, when resignations occurred, replaced five Law Lords who had political 
backgrounds by others whose reputations rested on their professionalism as lawyers. ( J. A. G. Griffiths. The 
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in courtesy between the court and counsel and between counsel. Quarrels in court were rare 
and when they did occur was regarded as a departure from professional good manners rather 
than a normal incident of litigation4. All barristers who practised in the common law courts 
were required to choose a circuit in which to work and by convention to dine frequently in 
the circuit mess. In the last decades of the 19 th Century  messes grew stronger in maintaining 
accepted professional standards of behaviour; the expulsion of Dr Kenealy, for his conduct in 
the criminal Tichborne Claimant case, from the Oxford Circuit Bar mess in 1874 is an early  
example of their willingness to take severe sanctions if  necessary.  Institution of  a bar mess 
at the Old Bailey in 1891, a step spoken about since the 1840’s to improve standards, may 
well have contributed to better behaviour there 5 . The conduct of prosecutions had also 
improved. Unlike in the previous century, they were no longer carried out in a “sneering 
hectoring manner with witnesses mercilessly browbeaten and bullied if the occasion 
warranted” 6 . The idea of the prosecutor acting as a minister of justice, and therefore not 
striving for a conviction at any cost, was now firmly part of the etiquette of the Bar. This 
limited, if it did not eliminate, appeals by prosecutors to jurors' emotions.  
It was widely held that Sir Richard Muir ( 1857-1924) was responsible for much of the 
improvement, especially at the Old Bailey - practice there influencing other courts - and 
introduced an atmosphere of fairness and impartiality in prosecutions which had never been 
seen before 7. Underhandedness or trickiness in the task was said to be alien to him 8. As a 
prosecutor he was regarded as the greatest of his time and represented the Crown in every 
trial of note in the Old Bailey from 1901 until his death. Born in Scotland, the son of a 
shipping broker from Greenock, he went to London with intentions of becoming an actor but, 
after a period working as a parliamentary reporter for The Times, abandoned his earlier 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Politics of the Judiciary, Fifth Edition, 1997, Fontana Press, Page 16. Also see, Shimon Shetreet , Judges on 
Tria l, 1976, North Holland Publishing Company, pp. 70 – 71. ) 
4Great shock was felt when two barristers fought in court in 1907. The incident is described by David Pannick, 
Advocates, Oxford, 1993, page 54.  
5
 Allyson May, The Bar and the Old Bailey, 1750-1850, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and 
London, 2003, page 242.  
 
6
 William Cornish, The Jury, Penguin Books, 1971 (revised edition) page 168. See also Leo Page First Steps in 
Advocacy, Faber and Faber, 1943, pp.127-128: “Years ago the name “Old Bailey lawyer” was a term of 
reproach. It indica ted the man who was out to get a  conviction even if it meant that he had to descend to any 
tr ick or unworthy expedient for the purpose…………….There has been a complete revulsion from those days 
when conviction was the object and the methods by which it was gained were immaterial” .  
7
  Richard DuCann, The Art of the Advocate , Revised Edition, 1993, Penguin Books, page 115. 
8
 See Travers Humphreys, who knew him well, Criminal Days, Hodder and Stoughton, 1946, page 81. 
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ambition, turned to law and was called to the Bar at Middle Temple, where he later became a 
Master of the Bench. Muir was known to be hard working with little apparent need for 
conviviality. He usually spent half the night preparing for his cases and made notes on small 
cards with coloured pencils- one colour for examination in chief, one for cross-examination 
and another for possible re-examination. It was reported Muir could check up in a moment 
upon any contradiction or alteration between evidence given by one witness and another at 
the trial and what he had said when at the police court 9. These cards were noticed in court 
and became known as Muir’s “playing cards”. He asked for painstaking thoroughness from 
the police in obtaining evidence. When presenting cases he placed much weight on physical 
evidence and little on eye witness testimony, except if it would bolster more concrete 
evidence. It was Muir who conducted the first prosecution involving finger print evidence in 
1902 10. Whilst Richard Muir deliberately avoided raising the emotional temperature, it was 
said that the “lucidity of his argument and the clarity with which he stated the facts in his 
opening speeches wove a net so tightly round the prisoner in the dock that he could never 
afterwards escape from it” 11. 
 
Such was his reputation for meticulousness and great diligence that Dr Crippen, on 
hearing that Muir was to prosecute him, said “I wish it had been anybody else…. I fear the 
worst”. Muir’s cross-examination of Crippen, before Lord Chief Justice Alverstone in Court 
No 1 at the Old Bailey, was a masterpiece of clear, direct and polite questioning, in simple 
language, each question dealing with one fact at a time, which conveyed to the jury the 
strength of the case for the prosecution. Characteristically, he saved all comment on the 
answers until his closing speech 12.  
                                                          
9
 Travers Humphreys, ibid, page 80. 
10
 Harry Jackson was found guilty at the Old Bailey of a charge of burglary of a house and stealing billiard 
balls. He received seven years penal servitude. The implications of the new technique were quickly realized in 
prosecutions. The attitude of some judges to fingerprints was one of distrust, but the value of this evidence was 
placed beyond doubt when, in 1910,the Court of Criminal Appeal upheld a conviction based solely on 
fingerprint evidence (R v Castleton (1909) 3 Cr App R 74). 
11
 Richard DuCann, The Art of the Advocate, Revised Edition, 1993, Penguin Books, page 72.  
12
 Richard DuCann, The Art of the Advocate Revised Edition 1993 ,Penguin Books, pp. 126-128. For that part 
of Muir’s cross-examination of Dr Crippin which concerned whether the human remains found in his house 
were those of Mrs Crippen, a vital question for the jury, see E.W. Fordham, Notable Cross –Examinations, 
Constable, 1951, Chapter XI. The influence of Edward Muir endures. Nearly a hundred years later his cross-
examination of Crippin is still held, by authors of text books on acquiring the skills of advocacy, to be a model 
of cross-examination techniques for both prosecution and defence. See, David Ross QC (Advocacy, Cambridge 
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Dramatic types of 19th century advocacy, in which counsel was prepared to adopt 
mannerisms, tricks of speech and gestures, parodied in Gilbert and Sullivan’s Trial by Jury , 
to heighten the effect of their plea , Professor Keeton reported in 1943 had become almost 
obsolete: 
“A visitor  straying into our courts (with the possible exception of the Central Criminal  
Court) might be forgiven if he imagined himself to be witnessing some unusual kind of 
company meeting. The tone of counsel is conversational and matter  of fact. There is a  
somewhat misleading air of casualness about the proceedings” 13 . 
   Sir Norman Birkett, an eminent advocate of the first half of the last century, in an 
address delivered in Gray's Inn Hall said of the altered style of advocacy: “There may have 
been days when a flowery speech was effective, but it is no longer effective. Times change; 
manners change; all things change. Though the advocate of today does not seek to commend 
himself by flowery speech, he does seek to be persuasive” 14 . Advocates now sought to be 
persuasive by a conversational matter of fact advocacy making points earnestly, and if 
necessary, with persistence but rarely indulging in rhetoric in its pejorative sense of artful 
bombast and verbal chicanery, and normally avoiding the sorts of tricks and effects that were 
used previously15 .  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
University Press, 2007,  pp.69-70. ), who quotes passages from it and Robert McPeake ( Advocacy Manual, 
Oxford University Press, 2009,  pp.179-188.), who reproduces a sizeable part. Richard Muir’s preparatory 
notes for his prosecution of Crippin, commended by David Ross as “ an example to us all”,  page 18, were 
found and published. They appear in Louis Blom-Cooper, The Law As Literature, The Bodley Head ,London, 
1961,pp.14-33. Also see a commentary on them by Mr Justice JH Phillips, Practica l Advocacy, ( 1988) 62 
Australian Law Journal 627-629.  
 
 
13
 G.W. Keeton, Harris’s Hints on Advocacy, Stevens and Sons, 1943, page 10. Nearly three decades before, in 
1915, in the Foreward to Illustra tions In Advocacy by Richard Harris K. C , Fifth Edition, a book mainly for 
aspiring and newly qualified barristers, George Elliot, K.C. wrote: “It is sa id by many tha t eloquence is not 
now encouraged in the courts, that the artifices of advocacy are discouraged, tha t a  pla in brief sta tement of 
fact, as concise and succinct as the na ture of the case will permit , is the style which best commends itself to the 
Bench, and the exigencies of time, whether in civil causes or in criminal tr ia ls, do not permit of those methods 
of advocacy which were so effective in days gone by”.  
14
  July 1st, 1957, entitled “The Advocate”, published in Graya, No 46, pp. 89-96. Viscount Simon, in his 
forward to Leo Page’s First Steps in Advocacy, Faber and Faber, 1943, pp. 7- 8, wrote: “A pla in accura te 
sta tement a rranged in the r ight order is worth tons of rhetoric. Juries , no less than magistra tes and judges, 
want to do r ight; they are not impressed, any of them, by bla ther and pomposity, but are gra teful for  clear 
exposition”.  
15
 Leo Page, First Steps in Advocacy, Faber and Faber, 1943, pp.20-27, considered advocates would most 
likely achieve success by “simplicity, sincerity and moderation” in manner and matter and that persuasiveness 
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Giving the Haldane Memorial Lecture, in the same year that Keeton wrote about advocacy in 
court, Sir Gervaise Rentoul, the Chief Stipendiary Magistrate of London, stated  “... anything 
in the nature of theatr icality should be avoided , although, in a criminal trial some dramatic 
licence may be permissible when the emotions of the jury are highly charged” 16. On cross--
examination he said: “The old idea that to cross-examine means the same as to examine 
crossly has long disappeared. The successful advocate nowadays no longer thumps the desk 
with his brief;  the rapier  has taken the place of the broadsword: Sergeant Buzfuz is dead” 17 . 
        In 1917 the governing body of the Bar, the Bar Council, adopted a number of rules to 
control barristers when faced with making suggestions of fraud or dishonesty or attacking the 
credit of witnesses they had to cross examine. Subject to minor amendments they continue 
today. 
Under the rules barristers could not suggest that a witness, or other person, is guilty of a 
crime , fraud or misconduct of which their client is accused unless such allegations go to a 
matter in issue (including the credibility of a witness) which was material to their client’s 
case and which appeared to them to be supported by reasonable grounds 18. Also they were 
prohibited from asking questions which were merely scandalous or intended or calculated 
only to vilify, insult or annoy either a witness or some other person 19 .  
Serjeant Buzfuss’s spirit of heavily belabouring witnesses in cross –examination had not 
entirely expired and appeared in a case before a High Court judge and a jury in 1934. The higher 
judiciary, however, showed a determination to send it on its way. The chief protagonists on 
either side of the cause, Mr Lehwess and Sir Herbert Austin respectively, were cross-examined. 
Measured by the shorthand note Mr Lehwess’s examination occupied 80 pages; his cross - 
examination 265 pages. The examination in chief of Sir Herbert Austin occupied 39 pages and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
would be much assisted by audibility, clear articulation,  inflection to avoid monotony and for emphasis and 
absence of studied gesture (Chapter 5 ). 
 
16
 On eschewing theatricality, Leo Page, First Steps in Advocacy, Faber and Faber, also published in 1943, 
page 24 wrote: “A law court is seldom a  fit place for stage business . Incidenta lly, the highly dramatic manner 
is a  treacherous tool in inexpert hands. A first-class tragedian moves us with horror and emotion, but a  second 
– ra te performer excites only our ridicule. So it is in court”.  
17
 Sir Gervais Rentoul,The Art and Ethics of Advocacy, Haldane Memorial Lecture, 1943, page 9. 
18
 Now contained in Bar Code of Conduct para 708(j) and Written Standards para5.10(h). Also, concerning 
advocacy by solicitors see Law Society’s Code for Advocacy, Part VII para 7.1 (h) . 
19
 Now embodied in Bar Code of Conduct para 708(h) and Written Standards para 5.10 . See also Law 
Society’s Code for Advocacy PartVII par7.1 (e). 
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his cross-examination 148 pages. On matters of law, the case went to the Court of Appeal and on 
further appeal to the House of Lords 20 . The Lord Chancellor, Viscount Sankey, agreed with the 
censure of Lord Hanworth , Master of the Rolls, in the Court of Appeal, who had said “There is 
a  tedious itera tion in some of the questions asked, and prolonged emphasis is la id on 
some matter s tr ivia l in rela tion to the main issues. Cross -examination is a  power ful and 
va luable weapon for  the purpose of testing the veracity of a  witness and the accuracy and 
completeness of his story. It is entrusted in the hands of counsel in the confidence tha t it 
will be used with discretion;  and with due regard to the  assistance to be rendered by it to 
the Cour t, not forgetting a t the same time the burden tha t is imposed upon witnesses. We 
desire to say tha t in our  opinion the cross-examination in the present case did not 
conform to the above conditions, and a t times it fa iled to display tha t measure of cour tesy 
to the witness which is by no means inconsistent with a  skilful, yet powerful, cross -
examination” 21 . 
The Lord Chancellor then went further in his criticism: 
“It is r ight to make due a llowance for  the ir r ita tion caused by the stra in and stress of 
a  long and complica ted case, but a  protracted and ir relevant cross -examination not only 
adds to the cost of litiga tion but is a  waste of public time. Such a  cross -examination 
becomes indefensible when it is conducted, as it was in this case, without restra int and 
without the cour tesy and considera tion which a  witness is entitled to expect in a  Court of 
law. It is not sufficient for  the due administra tion of justice to have a  learned, pa tient and 
impar tia l judge. Equally with him, the solicitors who prepare the case and the counsel 
who present it to the Court a re taking par t in the grea t task of do ing justice between man 
and man” 22 . 
 In the course of a lecture on advocacy at Gray’s Inn in 1938, Sir Malcolm Hilberry , then a 
King’s Bench judge, considered the place of emotion in jury trials. In contrast to blatantly 
emotional advocacy, often short on analysis of the facts - or indeed sometimes almost completely 
replacing it- which was much heard in the preceding century, he observed that triumphant jury 
                                                          
20
 Mechanica l and Genera l Inventions Co. and Lehwess v. Austin and the Austin Motor  Co . [1935 ] A.C. 
346. 
21
 Mechanica l and Genera l Inventions Co. and Lehwess v. Austin and the Austin Motor  Co.  [1935] A.C.  
359. 
22
 Ibid, page 360. 
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advocacy now made an appeal to reason combined with a subtle, restrained and focused appeal 
to emotion: 
 “You will notice………… tha t the successful jury advoca te a lways gives his address to 
a  jury in the form of a  well built a rgument, while the emphasis and appeal a re a ll th e 
time strongly emotiona l. The facts a re marsha lled to form the steps of the a rgument 
leading to the conclusion tha t is sought , but the nervous force of a  controlled emotion 
passes a ll the while from the advocate to the jury, fir st to a r rest their  a ttenti on, then to 
hold it, and fina lly to dominate their  judgment. It is in such work tha t rhetor ic has its 
place and the sense of the dramatic” 23 .  
 
 In a small profession where, until the end of the 1980’s, there was very little formal 
instruction on  it, the views of judges on advocacy, and their ability to act on them by the 
way they received advocates  in court, and those held by  senior barristers, were influential, 
especially on newly called members of the bar, whose main method of learning was studying 
more senior barristers -watching big men in court 24- , following the techniques of the 
successful and avoiding those of the unsuccessful.  
 
Continued decline of jury trials. 
   
 In addition to changes in professional etiquette and rules and readier acceptance by the 
Bar of judicial control over legal proceedings, already mentioned, a number of other reasons 
also account for the transformation in style that had occurred. Continued fall in civil jury 
trials undoubtedly played a significant part. Reduction in the use of civil juries begun in the 
19th century (by the end of that century only half of civil trials in the High Court were by a 
                                                          
23
 Duty and Art in Advocacy, a lecture delivered at Gray’s Inn in Hilary Term 1938, Graya NoXX, Easter, page 
11. Largely reproduced in Sir Malcolm Hilberry, Duty and Art in Advocacy, Sweet and Maxwell, 1946. 
Concerning the use of controlled emotion, Leo Page, First Steps in Advocacy, Faber and Faber, 1943, pp. 128-
129, wrote:  “It is legitimate for defending counsel to use pathos in order to move a  jury in the interests of his 
client. But it is not considered to be the duty of counsel for  the prosecution to be vindictive or to a ttempt to 
excite the indignation of a  jury against a  defendant by rhetoric”.  
24
 As regularly observing the performance of distinguished barristers in court was described by Leo Page First 
Steps in Advocacy, Page 73. 
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jury) gathered pace during the first half of the 20th century. After 1935 it could be asserted 
that the jury trials in county courts had practically ceased to exist. 
 At High Court level, the judicature commissioners and a departmental committee which 
reported in 1913 favoured a more restricted right to trial by jury in civil cases. No changes 
were made until the Juries Act 1918, which was principally enacted because of shortages of 
jurors in wartime. The Act provided that all cases in the High Court should be before a judge 
without a jury unless the Court saw fit to order one , subject to the right to jury trial in cases  
alleging fraud, libel, slander, malicious prosecution , false imprisonment, seduction, breach 
of promise to marry, contested matters in divorce and heir - ship in probate actions. The pre - 
Juries Act 1918 position regarding juries was, however, restored by the Administration of 
Justice Act, 1925. Complaints about the cost and delays in proceedings at common law led to 
the re-introduction of restrictive legislation in the form of the Administration of Justice Act 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1933 25 . This Act, which encountered very little public 
opposition, removed an absolute right to jury trial in the King's Bench Division of the High 
Court. Trial by jury was to be ordered in cases of fraud, libel, slander , malicious prosecution , 
false imprisonment, seduction or breach of promise of marriage unless the court was of the 
opinion that the trial required any prolonged examination of documents or accounts or any 
scientific or local investigation which could not be conveniently made with a jury. In other cases 
the Court had a discretion to order a jury. This was applied narrowly 26. Jury trial became more 
and more of a rarity as litigants, forsaking the traditionally rehearsed arguments in its support, 
increasingly opted for trial by judges alone to avoid delay and expense. Indeed seeking trial by 
jury came to be regarded with suspicion: it suggested the hope of confusion in a weak case, or 
the expectation of exorbitant damages in cases involving distressing details or high feelings 27. 
                                                          
25
 For a closely contemporary analysis of the Act’s provisions for civil jury trials see R. M. Jackson, Incidence 
of Jury Tria l During the Past Century, Modern Law Review, Volume 1, No 2, Sept. 1937,  pp. 141 – 142. 
26
 Under the present law, Section 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1981,  the right to jury trial is limited to 
only four specific areas: fraud, defamation, malicious prosecution and false imprisonment ( Similar 
provisions are contained in the County Courts Act 1984. ) Even in these matters , the right is not absolute 
and can be denied by a judge, under Section 69 ( i ) where the ca se involves any prolonged examina tion of 
documents or  accounts or  a ny scientific or  loca l investiga tion which cannot conveniently be made with a  
jury. 
27
 The temporary prohibition on civil jury service in the Second World War was a later blow from which 
civil juries never recovered. J. H. Baker, An Introduction to English Lega l History,  Butterworths, 2002, 
page 92.  
 10 
 
Decline of trial by jury amounted to a revolution in practice 28 . Persuasiveness in front of Judges 
with no jury needed advocates to concentrate clearly on the facts in issue, an ability to argue 
relevant law, and a brisk unrepetitious delivery. It did not require oratorical embellishment. A 
view from the judiciary on this point was clearly put by Mr Justice Hilberry in his address on 
advocacy at Gray's Inn Hall in 1938: 
 “A Judge is r endered uneasy by ora tor ica l flour ishes.  Let the language there conform 
to the standards of the best prose. In the words of Rober t Louis Stevenson "Beware of 
purple passages”. Wed yourself to a cold ‘austerity”.. Continuing, Hilberry then told an 
amusing story about Mr Justice Swift 29: 
 “A counsel, much given to emotional rhetor ic began to open a  case before the learned 
Judge sitting a lone. He had not gone fa r  before he was giving full r ein to his ora tory. Mr . 
Justice Swift tapped his desk;  "Mr. Blank", he sa id, "there is no jury." There came the 
appropr ia te apology but aga in counsel was soon indulging in rolling per iods and high-
flown declamation. For  some time the judge suffered it, then there came the tap of his 
pencil on the desk. "Usher", he sa id, "switch on the light over  the jury box - Mr. Blank 
does not believe me" 30 . 
  
                                                          
28
 A. H. Manchester, A Modern Lega l History of England and Wa les 1750 – 1950, Butterworths, 1980, 
page, 95. 
29
 For more on Rigby Swift see E. S. Fay, The Life of Mr. Justice Swift, Methuen, 1939.  
30
 In similar vein, though from the perspective of the Bar, Sir Patrick Hastings wrote: “The judge ha s been 
a t the game too long. His every instinct struggles aga inst the possibility tha t he may be influenced aga inst 
the true letter  of the la w by a  speech however  a r tistica lly or  impressively it ma y be phra sed. The decision 
is to be his and his a lone;  he knows the la w, and he desir es to know the facts;  and a fter  tha t he infi nitely 
prefers to be left alone”.  Patrick Hastings, Ca ses in Cour t, William Heinemann 1949, page 10. Lord 
Bingham, before his retirement as Senior Law Lord,  in The Role of the Advoca te in a  Common La w 
System, The Inaugural Birkenhead Lecture Given in Gray’s Inn Hall in 2008 ( seventy years after Mr 
Justice Hilberry’s lecture on advocacy), Gra ya , No 122, Hilary 2009, pp. 17-24, said whilst “ an advoca te 
might reasonably hope to touch the heartstrings of the jury more readily than those of a judge….. even 
judges were not the unfeeling decision-making machines they might sometimes appea r ;  they r esponded to 
considera tions of justice and injustice, r ight and wrong, human fra ilty and human need;  there wa s often 
tr easure there, which under sta ted eloquence could unlock”. When interviewed at the House of Lords on 
23rd October, 2007, Lord Bingham said it would be wrong to think that judges in earlier times were never 
influenced by such considerations, carefully and subtly put by advocates.  
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 Opportunities for criminal trials before juries lessened in 1925 when the Criminal Justice Act 
of that year brought a large number of offences previously triable only by a judge and jury within 
the jurisdiction of magistrates at petty sessions 31 . 
 
Impact of leading members of the bar. 
 
     G. W Keeton saw the more restrained and conversational advocacy that had emerged in 
criminal jury trials to have been influenced by the style of advocates in civil cases: “In as much 
as the most influentia l members of the bar  who set fashions in advocacy appear  most 
frequently in civil cases, the methods followed by them tend to become genera l ” 32 . As an 
example of this, he mentions the effect of Rufus Isaacs, the great majority of whose cases were 
civil. When he was a Law Officer and appeared in criminal cases, Sir Rufus was never rude to 
the prisoner in his cross-examination. Rather, he was courteous, almost deferential, but the effect 
of his questions was to build up a case of deadly significance, as was clearly seen in his 
prosecution of the poisoner Arthur Seddon in 1912. Keaton saw these traditions being carried 
over to the present day and “being firmly established in our  advocacy”. 
Two influential and fashion setting members of the Bar during the first half of the 20 th 
Century were Patrick Hastings and Norman Birkett, each will now be discussed.  
 
Sir Patrick Hastings and his effect on advocacy.  
 
 Sir Patrick Hastings (1880- 1952), who was made a  King’s Counsel in 1919, became one of 
the leading barristers of his time, and, at the top of his profession, earned very considerable fees 
33
 . In 1912 he led for the defence of John Williams in the Eastbourne “Case of the Hooded 
Man”, which made national headlines. Although Williams was convicted, Hastings’s highly 
intelligent and focused defence strategy was much admired. His practice afterwards was almost 
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completely in the civil courts in divorce, libel and fraud cases, often before juries. Mostly unlike 
other barristers, his style of advocacy,   may, to some extent,  have followed Charles Russell and 
Edward Carson, at least  in cross-examination 34. He was known to be contemptuous of the 
passionate appeals made to juries by advocates like Marshall Hall. Hastings was a master of 
direct forcible speech without any embellishments or ornamentation and recognized the immense 
value of brevity. According to Sir Norman Birkett, a friend and who frequently opposed him in 
court, Patrick Hastings was not a great speaker in the conventional sense: 
 “He was cer ta inly not in the tradition of Sher idan, Char les James Fox and Edmund 
Burke. He was not a  grea t reader  and his mind was not stored with the r iches of English 
litera ture or  the grea t speeches of ora tors in ancient and modern times ”. (This may, 
partly, have been because of an interrupted public school education at Charterhouse. When the 
Second Boer War, 1889- 1902, broke out he had enlisted in the British Army) " It was quite 
cha racter istic of him tha t he should affect to be scornful of forensic ora tory of the 
flamboyant range because it was quite a lien to his style of advocacy, and rea lly outside 
his range;  for  in a ll tha t he did he seemed to want to put himself in a  ca tegory of his 
own” 35 .  
In his openings, whether for the plaintiff or the defendant , he was never long and rarely 
stylish. In print, the words chosen would appear to be random. Such an impression would have 
been entirely false as they were selected with great care to bring the case within the limits that 
Hastings wished to be set for it. He was able to do this by having complete mastery of  his brief 36 
.  
 Hastings stood straight and still in court, kept his eyes fixed on whoever he was 
speaking to, very rarely gestured with his hands, and avoided distractions, sometimes 
made deliberately by other barristers, such as jangling coins in his pockets, fiddling with 
the ribbon on a brief or taking numerous drinks of water from a tumbler. He always spoke 
in a good clear voice.  Great preparation ensured he was in complete command of his 
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brief, had no need to refer to papers during trial and could carefully observe the jury for 
small but significant signs37.  
His examination in chief, much  resembling that of  Sir Frank Lockwood earlier , appeared to 
be a conversation with the witness. Hastings would smile at some answer as though it had come 
to him by surprise, when it was really the answer he wanted and expected. 
The outstanding strength of Hastings was in cross-examination. His frequent opponent, 
Sir Norman Birkett, recalled: 
 
 “He could destroy a  witness with quite sha tter ing power  with his direct, incisive and 
penetra ting questions tha t came with the precision and speed of a  machine gun. 
Remorselessly and relentlessly he broke down a ll defences, and when the tr iumph was 
complete he would make the br iefest possible speech and sit down” 38 . 
 
Hastings regarded cross-examination as “the grea t, perhaps the fina l, test of advocacy”. 
Although he said that he selected the one essential element, without which a ll others a re 
completely useless, he wished to deal with, Hastings claimed that he did not prepare specific 
questions beforehand. He preferred to wait until such time he had carefully decided, by listening 
to examination in chief, whether a witness, “was truthful or  dishonest, stupid or  cunning, 
intelligent or  foolish” 39. The ability to assess accurately and almost instantaneously the 
personality and mentality of the witness facing him was to him the key skill in cross-
examination; very different  to the  indiscriminate  and loud “blunderbuss” approach in  cross-
examinations, much heard in Victorian times and earlier. 
 
On his experience of being cross-examined by Hastings, in the libel case of Laski v The 
Newark Adver tiser  and Par lby in 194640, in which he sued the Nottinghamshire paper in libel 
                                                          
37
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for a report that he advocated violence to achieve socialism at a public general election meeting 
in Newark, in 1945, Harold Laski wrote: 
 
“He performs his war  dance about you like a  dervish intoxica ted by the sheer  ecstacy 
of his skill in performance, a rdent in his knowledge tha t, if you tr ip for  one second, his 
knife is at your throat…….He moves between the lines of sarcasm and insult. It is an 
effor t to tear  off, piece by piece, the skin which he decla res no more t han a  mask behind 
which any man of understanding could have grasped the foulness of your  purpose. He 
trea ts you not a s a  human being , but a s a  surgeon might tr ea t some specimen he is 
demonstra ting to students in a  dissecting room” 41 . 
 
Like Sir Edward Carson, whose style may well have consciously or sub-conscientiously shape 
his own, Patrick Hastings excelled in the arts of denigration, especially ridicule 42. 
 
Writing in the 1960’s, the eminent barrister and writer on advocacy Richard DuCann QC 
(1929 – 1994) considered Patrick Hastings was the finest cross-examiner before the English 
Courts in the 20th Century. Nonetheless, he strongly criticized him for ruthlessness and gross 
discourtesy which was unfair to witnesses and on occasions led to courts drawing the wrong 
conclusions 43. Concerning this behaviour, which went un-rebuked wherever he practiced, 
DuCann gives the example of Hastings’s cross-examination of Air Marshall Sir Hugh Vivian de 
Crespigny, who had been the Labour candidate for Newark and present when Laski spoke at the 
meeting. DuCann. presents the whole of the short cross-examination 44 :  
 
Hastings: “Do you recognize this expression: ‘It did not lie in the mouth of any 
member  of the Tory par ty, who helped to organize the mutiny in the British Army over  
Home Rule in 1914, to discuss the question of violence?  Do you remember  anything 
like tha t being sa id by anyone”?  
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Sir Hugh:  “No I do not . That does not mean it was not sa id”. 
Hastings: “Many things may have been said that you did not hear?”  
Sir Hugh: “Sir Patrick……” 
Lord Chief Justice Goddard: “Will you try and answer  the question Yes or  No. We rea lly 
must try and get on with this case”. 
Sir Hugh: “There was nothing vital that I would not have heard” . 
Hastings: “If you did not hear  it, how did you know whether  it was vita l or  not? ” 
Sir Hugh: “I must ask your  permission to elucida te this so a s not to give the wrong 
impression…”… 
Hastings: “No thank you” (sitting down) 
Slade: “I have no questions in re-examination” 45. 
 
In effect, Hastings had refused to let the witness give the evidence he wanted to and 
also, of course, the jury the opportunity of hearing it 46. Remarkably, Gerald Slade KC, 
leading counsel for Laski, and later a Judge of the High Court, did not seek to rectify this 
in re-examination, nor did Lord Chief Justice Goddard intervene.  
 
     Sir Patrick Hastings was invariably short in cross-examination, partly, perhaps because of a 
realization that a jury may quickly spot an advocate’s failure to undermine a witness and as a 
result attach a disproportionate importance to his or her evidence. He also had the gift, possessed  
by  Sir Edward Carson with whom he had worked, of crystallizing in a few questions the whole 
of the case he wished to advance and the bravery to do so:  
 
“The ability to pick out the one rea l point of a  case is not itself enough;  it is the courage 
required to seize upon tha t point to the exclusion of a ll others tha t is of rea l importance . 
Pa instaking solicitors will place before counsel perhaps fifty different points,  a ll of them 
prepared with skill and ca re;  it must indeed cause bitter  disappointment to find them 
disrega rded and the whole tr ia l proceeding as though there was only one solita ry element 
tha t was rea lly wor thy of considera tion. It r equires some courage in  an advocate to stake 
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his own opinion perhaps against tha t of a ll who are assisting  him;  it is a  grea t r isk. But 
in a  proper  case he must be prepared to take it”  47 .  
 
      Infelicitous or inappropriate replies of witnesses were quickly seized upon. A distinctive 
feature of Hastings’s style of cross-examination was use of comment after a witness had 
answered a question. Many of his contemporaries refrained from any comment on answers given 
in cross–examination until their closing speech. Sir Edward Carson, who Hastings greatly 
admired and was said to be influenced by, almost always put his comments within the framework 
of his questions. Hastings was different and showed this clearly, in 1913, soon after being made 
a Kings Counsel, when he was called upon to cross-examine Bob Sievier who had brought an 
action in libel against Richard Wootton, a race horse owner and trainer48. Sievier, a pugnacious, 
witty and flamboyant character, represented himself. Carson, who had been leading Hastings, 
was called to Ireland in the middle of examining the plaintiff. In cross-examining Sievier, 
Hastings matched every jest with biting comment as this brief extract shows: 
 
Hastings: “Did you mar ry your  first wife in 1882”?  
Sievier: “Unfortunately for me, I did”. 
Hastings: “Unfor tunately for  her , too. Did she divorce you in 1886, four  years la ter? ” 
Sievier:  “ She did”. 
 
Another vivid example, much later in his career, is provided by Hastings’s treatment 
of one of the witnesses in the Harold Laski libel case:  
 
Hastings: “Did you hear  anything of this sor t:  Grea t changes were so urgent in this 
country that if they were not made by consent they would be made by violence?’ Did you 
hear  him [Laski] say tha t”?  
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Witness: “No, not in those words”. 
Hastings: “Dear , oh dea r , Mr Laski seems to be so unfor tunate. He must have been very 
good at hearing himself; he said that is what he did say…”. 
 
Richard DuCann considered the  “modern fashion” for advocates to include comment either 
direct or indirect in cross-examination was largely due to the influence of Hastings style 49. 
Hastings , almost without exception, made his last question in cross-examination a comment . 
This, too, was copied by other barristers. 
 
In his closing speeches to juries, Hastings spoke in a simple conversational narrative, 
no tortuous sentences or elegance of expression, analysed the facts and made no attempt 
at passionate persuasion. At all times he was able to convey to jurors he was in earnest, 
not merely playing a part, and that he respected their independence and judgement. 
Lecturing, cajoling or flattery were never resorted to. The closing speech was the main 
place for him to use his great ability to capture the essence of a case in just a few words.  
It was a device of Hastings, before juries, to lay claim to the virtues of plain speech, 
straightforwardness and brevity. This is prominently illustrated in his closing speech in 
the Laski case when he began by saying: 
 
 “May it please Your  Lordship:  Members of the Jury, I can star t what I have to say to 
you with perhaps the only bit of good news you have heard so far . That is tha t I only 
going to address you for  a  few minutes. I want to expla in why, because I do not want you 
to think, and I hope you will not think, tha t the va lue of anything tha t is to be  sa id to you 
is to be measured by the number  of words”. 
 
In order to create the impression that he was about to make an appeal to their reason, 
rather than the sort of emotional address which had once been popular in courts, he 
continued: 
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 “You may remember  in the old days it was the habit of advocates sometimes to make 
long and eloquent speeches on a ll sor ts of subjects, including comments on the Goddess 
of Justice who sits with sca les above the cour t……”. 
 
   The technique of emphasizing to jurors, early in a closing speech, that reason would be 
engaged became much used, especially after the triumphs of Hastings and other leading 
advocates who employed it. The reality, though, is that emotion is frequently disguised by 
advocates as reason. 
 
 Three quarters through his speech Hastings said: 
 
“I told you I was only going to be a  few minutes . I have been fifteen , and I am afra id 
tha t is too long. I wish you good luck tha t Mr Slade will not be four  times a s long . 
Whether  you will get tha t good luck or  not, I do not know. I doubt it”. 
 
     In the event Slade spoke for two hours. In contrast to the tight, well constructed and stylish 
speech of Hastings, his was spiritless, diffuse and very repetitive. Given the jury’s decision 
against Laski, which left him with enormous costs, Slade’s performance came to be  seen as a 
lesson  how not to make a closing speech 50 .  
 
     Whilst the rather cheap gibe against opposing counsel was not widely used, the practice of 
promising to be brief, keeping it, thus creating the impression of a reliable guide through the 
evidence, and drawing a comparison, usually implicitly, with the greater length of an opponent’s 
closing speech, hoping to create  resentment for the time taken, was a well tried method and one 
that  was reinforced by Hastings’s successes in major cases. 
 
 
 A further tactic, frequently employed by him, to gain advantage over opponents by 
blunting the effect of theirs, was to claim (falsely) that final speeches had little or no 
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effect on the outcome of cases. Again this is illustrated in Laski, when towards the start 
of his speech, Hastings told the jury:  
 
“I may say after  long exper ience tha t I have never  known a  case in which anything I 
have sa id has had any affect on a  jury one way or  another , and th erefore I have come to 
the conclusion tha t the shor ter  the time I take in saying it the better  for  everyone ”. 
 
 According to Richard DuCann, an unfortunate legacy of Hastings was that many modern 
advocates took him seriously in doubting that closing speeches had any effect on the outcome of 
cases. They treat it as “the advocate’s eleventh commandment tha t they do not and  stumble 
through the odious ta sk of addressing the Judge or  jury, bor ing themselves a lmost a s 
much as their  audience” 51 . 
 
Whilst Patrick Hastings did much to distance himself from the forensic approach of Marshall 
Hall they shared, despite being supremely good jury advocates, not being especially learned in 
the law 52. In this he was not seen as a model at the bar. Nor was he for his occasional losses of 
temper and display of personal sensitivity; traits also in common with Marshall Hall. This is 
perhaps best illustrated by another passage from the Laski trial . During his cross-examination of 
Laski, then the Chairman of the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party, Hastings, 
who had been appointed Attorney General in the first Labour Government in 1924, but left active 
politics a few years later, broke off in the middle of a question: 
 
Hastings:” …….are there any pr ivileged in the Labour  Par ty?” 
Laski: “Why indeed, Sir Patrick, when you were a member………” 
Lord Chief Justice Goddard: “No, Mr Laski”. 
Hastings: “Do not be rude”. 
Laski: “That is the last thing I want in the worl”. 
Hastings: “It may be difficult for  you to be cour teous, but do not be rude”. 
Laski: “Not in the least”. 
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Hastings: “You are rude to everyone a re you not? ” 
Laski:”I do not think so”. 
 
 
 
Sir Patrick Hastings, in the introduction to his memoirs, published in 1949, wrote 53: 
 
“For  my par t, the grea test change tha t I have noticed dur ing the past 40 years lies 
amongst members of my own profession. Ponderous ora tory, once so popular , and based 
undoubtedly upon Cicero’s orations, has completely d isappeared. Just as Gera ld du 
Maurier  sounded the dea th knell of the old time school of thunderous declamation from 
the stage 54 so Edward Carson put an end to forensic pla titudes and passionate but 
ir relevant perora tions from the bar . That such a  change is an improvemen t no wear ied 
juryman would deny”.  
  
There can be little doubt that Patrick Hastings, through his numerous triumphs at the 
Bar, influenced  advocacy in a number of ways including: the practice of cross -
examination and closing speeches: the need for carefully chosen words, to support a well 
thought out strategy, and to use them with economy and without unnecessary repetition; 
forcible and direct delivery without adornment; and an emphasis on an appeal to reason, 
rather than apparent emotion. His plain,conversationa land  highly concentrated, rather 
than diffuse, form could well be seen as taking  advocacy further than had  been begun by 
Edward Carson, Rufus Isaacs, and F E Smith. The success of Hastings before juries, it is 
argued, indicates not only how he was able to speak in the language of his time but also 
his ability to  understand the sensibilities of jurors, who were now so very different, for a 
variety of social factors, from those in earlier times. It is possible to speculate that his 
association with drama criticism and writing plays himself  may have aided his 
comprehension of the contemporary mind. 
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Norman Birkett. 
       Lord Birkett( 1883-1962), more widely known during his lifetime as Norman Birkett, K. C. 
was called to bar in 1913, took silk in 1924 and became a judge in the Kings Bench Division in  
1941. He was one of the British judges at the trial of major war criminals at Nuremberg.  
Afterwards, he was made a Lord Justice of Appeal. When at the Bar he established a great 
reputation as an advocate in the civil and criminal courts and was much in demand 55 . Notable 
civil clients included Lady Gladstone, Lady Mountbatten and Mrs Wallace Simpson. He 
appeared either for the prosecution or the defence in a number of murder trials and sensational 
criminal cases. Shortly before his appointment to the High Court Bench, as was the custom, at 
least until the 1960’s, for eminent QCs about to be elevated to the judiciary to be given a 
notorious murder case, he was presented in 1931 with the brief to prosecute Rouse56, a motorist 
alleged to have murdered his passenger and then set fire to his car to destroy the body and the 
evidence. An expert engineer for the defence gave evidence about the fusion of two bits of metal, 
thereby establishing a powerful point for the accused. Birkett rose to cross-examine.  
 
“What” he asked in his precise, musical way,” is the co-efficient of brass?” 
 
The witness replied “I do not know”. 
 
The question had taken the expert completely unaware. It made him so wary of Birkett, that 
when he was asked: “You are an engineer, aren’t you?” he said “I suppose so!” Quickly and 
devastatingly, Birkett had destroyed his credibility entirely 57. 
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    Birkett and Hastings were regularly pitted against each other much in the same way as Edward 
Carson and Rufus Isaacs in the previous generation and more recently Edward Marshall Hall and 
Henry Curtis Bennett had been. Birkett’s biographer, H.Mountgomery Hyde, described how 
differences in forensic methods employed by the two advocates were reflected in their respective 
styles of cross-examination, each equally effective and produced similar results: 
 
“Hastings, with his beetling eyebrows, would fix an unfor tunate witness with a  severe 
look. ‘ Now , let me see, Mr A.’ he would say and proceed to fire questions at him in such 
quick succession tha t he sometimes la id himself open to the cha rge of bullying. His fr iend 
Roland Per twee, with a  euphemistic touch, has descr ibed his manner  in handling 
witnesses in court as ‘cool, concise and gently cynical’. Birkett on the other hand, had a 
more sauve and polished approach, as well as perhaps a deceptively friendly one . ‘I 
wonder if you can help me, Mr. A.?’ he would usually begin. But the admissions wh ich he 
gradually and eventually elicited, ……., could pulverize a prevaricating or untruthful 
witness as completely as Hastings’s more robust methods of questioning” 58 . 
  
     Later in his life he lectured, broadcast and wrote about advocacy. It can be said with certainty 
that he too influenced other advocates in the first half of the 20th Century and beyond. 
 In an address to the Holdsworth Club of the Faculty of Law in the University of Birmingham in 
1954 59, Lord Birkett outlined much of his views about the advocacy he had delivered and liked 
to hear as a judge. He acknowledged the vast importance of: mastering the facts of the case; 
knowledge of the relevant law; the special qualities needed for examination in chief 60 and cross-
examination and re-examination; the selection and formulation of the arguments; the widely 
differing styles of advocacy required for particular tribunals, whether they be judge alone, or 
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judge and jury, or appellate courts; and the construction and arrangement of opening and closing 
speeches. However, Birkett considered the over-riding quality to be – command of language: 
“If the argument of the advocate is presented in clear  and choice language which seems 
to come natura lly and easily from the speaker  ,and if in addition the advocate can make 
use of what appears to be quite na tura l gesture, the very argument itself seems more 
persuasive”. 
Differing somewhat from Sir Patrick Hastings, who spoke forcibly without elegance of 
expression, ornamentation and embellishment, Birkett believed that: 
 
“in the main ta sk of advocacy, the exposition, the nar ra tive, the summing -up, the 
persuasion, the advocate may use, and I think ought to use, the full range of our wonderfully 
flexible English speech. For  there is no speech to equal it in its amazing r ichness of 
expression………”. 
 
Therefore, he held the advocate should be a student of words, knowing something at least of their 
history, sound, meaning, associations and, above all, the use that great masters of the tongue 
have made of them. In this respect Birkett considered it well to know the Authorised Version of 
the Bible, the Book of Common Prayer, and have a knowledge of “the grea t tr iumvira te, 
Chaucer , Dryden and Shakespeare – who did so much to mould the fa shion the 
language”, and of writers like Swift, Sterne and Defoe,” the great stylists”. 
To him, even in casual conversation, natural and graceful English was a desirable 
accomplishment, which most people found pleasant and a surprising number secretly wished to 
attain themselves “And how much more is it to be desired when the whole purpose of the 
advocate is to ga in the ends he seeks by the impression he crea tes upon the par ticular  
tribunal before which he appears”. 
 
 Factors influencing the style of advocacy that had become established. 
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       Other, deeper reasons, contributed to the mainly conversational and matter of fact advocacy 
that had become established. Taste for melodrama, strong sentiment and froth, much represented 
in Victorian drama and literature, had waned in the late 19th Century and was displaced by a 
more restrained and reflective aesthetic with an emphasis on realism. In the 1890’s drama in 
Britain, through George Bernard Shaw and others including Henrik Ibsen, the pioneer of modern 
realistic drama, became a forum for considering moral, political and economic issues 61.  
       Almost since rhetoric began in ancient Greece there was disagreement between those who 
saw it as a means of authenticating truth and those who saw it as a method of deception, 
sometimes termed “false rhetoric”. Although the 19th Century was a deeply oratorical age, as the 
century wore on, rhetoric came to be popularly seen in a negative light. Two instances perhaps 
best illustrate this .As early as the 1860’s, Thomas Huxley (“Darwin’s Bulldog”) accused the 
opponents of Darwin’s theory of evolution of hiding behind rhetoric. In a famous speech in 
1879, Disraeli, in possibly an example of the pot calling the kettle black, said of Gladstone, then 
the Prime Minister, that he was: 
 “A sophistica l rhetor ician, inebr ia ted with the exuberance of his own verbosity ,and 
gifted with an egotistica l imagination tha t can a t a ll times command an interminable and 
inconsistent ser ies of a rguments to malign an opponent and to glorify himself” 62 .  
       Drawing from drama, and indicative of feeling towards rhetoric at the beginning of the 20th 
Century, Harley Granville-Barker, in his 1905 play, The Voysey Inher itance, about the effects 
of corruption in a family firm of solicitors, has the bluff army major, Booth, say on a number of 
occasions, Do not speak rhetor ic to me!, when he thinks others are not being straight forward 
with him. 
      Dramatic types of advocacy , in which counsel adopted mannerisms , tricks of speech, 
gestures, aggression and sometimes insults, became seen as a part of rhetoric, in the pejorative 
sense of artful bombast and verbal chicanery, and for that reason were widely disapproved. 
Jurors became far better informed than before, capable of seeing through it and resentful when 
empty rhetoric was tried on them. It may well be that the success of men such as Hardinge 
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Giffard, John Holker, Charles Russell, and Edward Clarke was partly because they recognised 
the change in the mood of the public towards rhetoric and altered their advocacy accordingly in 
the later 19th Century. 
        As a consequence of 19th Century reforms, education was available to more people 63. 
Universal elementary school education, with its emphasis on the “3 Rs” (reading, writing and 
arithmetic), was introduced in the 1860’s. Although teaching ended at an early age, the basic 
literacy and numeracy provided by it gave many the means of obtaining further knowledge 64.  
    Parliament’s decision in 1857 to create public lending libraries provided an important source. 
The growing number of national and municipal museums and galleries helped stimulate 
intellectual curiosity. Working class self improvement, though unevenly spread, was another 
significant cause of increase in overall educational standards65.  
Dozens of new private schools, often modelled on Thomas Arnold’s Rugby School, to cater for 
the sons, and some daughters, of the growing middle class were opened in the latter part of the 
Nineteenth Century. These added to the general level of education in society. 
 Beyond  elementary education, the content of many school curriculums expanded to encompass 
the burgeoning sciences with their rational enquiry. Increasing amounts of knowledge were 
disseminated in newspapers and , in the next century, by wireless. By the 1880’s Darwin’s theory 
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of evolution had entered popular culture 66 . Religious certainty , because of scientific 
explanation - succinctly put, Darwin’s books drove a  car t through an older  book -  began to 
lessen from mid Victorian times. For this and other reasons, it diminished still further in the 
remaining part of the century and after67. The sort of impassioned appeal before juries to the 
deity, quotations and stories from the bible, so much used earlier, could no longer be relied upon. 
In short, jurors with broader perspectives expected more of an appeal to reason from advocates in 
a conversational and matter of fact manner, rather than one histrionically directed at their 
emotions and faith 68. From the 1920’s it has been suggested that distaste for the continental 
European demagogues, such as Hitler, Mussolini, and Franco, with their power by oratory and 
theatre to move audiences in terrible directions, may also have contributed to jurors suspicions of 
obvious rhetoric 69.      The advent of radio broadcasting led to widespread abandoning of 
grand declamatory forms of public oratory in favour of a more personal "fireside" approach.  
It may be reasonable to suggest that this further helped the cause of conversational, rather 
than declamatory, advocacy before juries. 
     In the first capital defence case he conducted on his own, that of Marie Herman in 1894, an 
Austrian prostitute charged with killing a client, Marshall-Hall, with tears streaming down his 
face, told the jury in his peroration: “Remember  tha t these women a re what men made them; 
even this woman was a t one time a beautiful and innocent child”. Flinging an arm in the 
defendant's direction in the dock he continued:” Look a t her , gentlemen of the jury. Look 
a t her . God never  gave her  a  chance - won't you ?” . Just a few decades later, because of 
jurors’ different expectations , this approach would have been received with embarrassment 
rather than anything else: no longer dazzlingly effective oratorical pyrotechnics; at best a damp 
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squib 70. Along similar lines, J Alderson Foote recounted how Montagu Williams defending a 
prisoner charged with fraud in1877 (Chapter Four), said of two witnesses against his client:  
“Excellent in vice and exquisite in fraud – the cunning of a  ca t teeming from the eyes of 
one;  the oily soft serpent-like treachery of deceit tr ickling from the mouth of the other”. 
Foote, speculating on how jurors would react in 1910, said: 
 “Few indeed are the advoca tes nowadays who could venture upon such flights without 
exciting derision” 71. In 1921 , Bernard Kelly  explained how juries now seemed to have a 
higher appreciation of facts , usually little regard for mere graces of language and almost none 
for sentimental appeals : “….. cynica l yawns , and not higher  emotions , more often than 
not greet the most pa thetic effor ts of counsel to crea te a  sentimenta l leaning towards 
their  clients at the expense of actual fact” 72.  
      Amusingly, drawing on recollections from his career, A W Cockburn Q C described a case 
when “grandiloquence” and “ idle histrionics” did not commend itself to a jury; the implicit 
message being that a more conversational style might have done so: 
“I cannot forget hear ing an extraordinary perora tion in a  very ordinary case some years 
ago which finished up with, ‘Members of the Jury, the moving finger  writes, and having 
writ moves on……’ Then came a slight misquotation, and with a flourish of his coloured  
handkerchief, the exhausted ora tor  sa t down. It had a ll been very moving;  and after  a  
shor t brea th-taking pause, came the summing up, in which the empyrean level was not 
even a imed a t;  and in a  few seconds an ear th-bound jury were in their  own simple way 
recording wha t they thought about coloured handkerchiefs and moving fingers” 73. 
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By  changing their style of advocacy before juries towards the conversational and matter of 
fact, barristers consciously, or sub- consciously, followed Cicero's cautionary advice given 
centuries ago and avoided the “very ca rdina l sin in ora tory; that is to depar t from the 
language of everyday life and usage approved of by the sense of the community” 74. 
A possible further explanation for the transformation to a more conversational and matter of 
fact advocacy may have been the reduction of court reporting in newspapers, removing much of 
the gallery from the stage. Attempting to catch the eye of the press for words spoken in court, 
aiding a barrister’s reputation, (sometimes also very useful to fulfill political ambitions) was an 
important contributory factor behind the emotive, theatrical, florid, and aggressive advocacy of 
the early Victorian period and after 75 . As late as the 1930’s proceedings in court were still much 
reported, making barristers household names76. For instance in a popularity poll organized in 
1935 by William Hickey, the Daily Express columnist, who invited readers to write to the 
newspaper naming the public personalities they most liked reading about, Norman Birkett got 
into the first twenty77 . 
  After the War there were fewer reports from the courts, partly because of a shortage of paper 
and newsprint which led to cuts in the size of papers generally ( For a time newspapers were 
restricted to only eight pages.). Sir Patrick Hastings, in 1949, compared the situation with “not 
very long ago when every tr ia l of the slightest importance was repor ted in the public 
press” . He continued: “Morning papers had a  page devoted to Law repor ts ;  evening 
papers displayed posters announcing every deta il of so -ca lled important tr ia ls and 
possibly even of the persons mainly concerned;  there were murder  cases, libel cases, 
cases about old ladies disputing over  garden walls, even breach of promise cases. Every 
tr ibula tion known to human life was brought before us and i ts appropr ia te remedy 
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displayed. When the Courts were closed , the papers were ha lf empty, and people knew 
tha t the silly season had ar r ived;  something was missing from their  da ily lives ” 78.  
 
The decline in volume of reports from court, and hence attention given to the efforts of 
advocates, appears to have continued throughout the 1950’s. Reduced press interest in the courts 
was noted by Lord Birkett at the start of the 1960’s 79 .  
The thesis continues by considering alterations in advocacy before juries in the second half of the 
20th Century and what has accounted for them (Chapter Ten). Changes scrutinized include: the 
falling away in the use of Aristotle’s ancient order of closing speeches, which usually ended with 
an emotive peroration ; the enormous expansion of eligibility to serve on juries, a 
democra tisa tion , brought about by the Juries Act 1974, leading to great adjustments in the way 
jurors were addressed and to different allusions and references made by advocates; the reduction, 
and eventual abolition, by the Criminal Justice Act, 1988, of peremptory challenge of jurors; the 
removal of certain offences from Crown Court jury trial; prosecutions conducted in more 
measured tones and more methodical and less aggressive defences, although the latter was not 
always being seen in sexual offences cases; decline in weight attached by juries to police 
evidence; less heavy drinking by some barristers and the positive effects of this on their 
performance in court; the rise of plea bargaining and the need to mitigate effectively after guilty 
pleas; the introduction of Social Enquiry Reports and their effect on pleas in mitigation; the need 
to make, and respond to, submissions arising out of key changes in evidence and procedure 
concerning exclusion of confessions, when adverse inferences can be drawn from silence to 
questions put to the accused and from admission of a defendant’s bad character; increased 
employment of expert witnesses in trials; the use of special measures for vulnerable and 
intimidated witnesses and of witness protection orders in trials of serious and violent offences; 
submission of written skeleton arguments on complex questions of law; and victim impact 
statements. The prospect of trials without juries in complex frauds and where there is a danger of 
jury tampering is also looked at. 
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